Why Dominant Governing Parties Are Cross-Nationally Influential by Bohmelt, TFK et al.
Why Dominant Governing Parties Are Cross-Nationally Influential  
 
 
Previous research suggests that political parties learn from and emulate the successful 
election strategies of governing parties in other countries. But what explains variation in the de-
gree of influence that governing parties have on their foreign counterparts? We argue that “clari-
ty of responsibility” within government, or the concentration of executive responsibility in the 
hands of a dominant governing party, allows parties to learn from the most obviously electorally 
successful incumbents. It therefore enhances the cross-national diffusion of party programs. To 
test this expectation, we analyze parties’ policy positions in 26 established democracies since 
1977. Our results indicate that parties disproportionately learn from and emulate dominant, high-
clarity foreign incumbents. This finding contributes to a better understanding of the political con-
sequences of “government clarity” and sheds new light on the heuristics that engender party pol-
icy diffusion by demonstrating that the most visible foreign incumbents, whose platforms have 
yielded concentrated power in office, influence party politics “at home.”  
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When politicians and party strategists make programmatic choices to position their party 
for electoral success, they work in the context of considerable uncertainty (Budge 1994, 445; see 
also Somer-Topcu 2009; 2015), which may cause them to rely on heuristics or “cognitive 
shortcuts” (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; see also Rosenau 1990). Heuristics are short-
hand guides to rational action under uncertainty (for example, Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Gale and Kariv 2003; Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Previous research suggests that political 
parties respond to the uncertainties of programmatic choice by employing the heuristic of learn-
ing from and emulating other parties’ positions, including from recently successful governing 
parties abroad (Böhmelt, Ezrow, Lehrer, and Ward 2016), and from political parties in their own 
domestic sphere (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Laver 2005; Williams 2015; Williams and 
Whitten 2015).1 
The following article examines which foreign incumbent platforms provide the most rele-
vant and influential precedent for political parties. To this end, we combine research on the dif-
fusion of parties’ policies (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Meguid 2005, 2008; Laver 2005; 
Williams 2015; Williams and Whitten 2015; Böhmelt et al. 2016) with the literature on “clarity 
of responsibility” (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000; 
Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013). Work on the clarity of 
responsibility studies voters’ ability to determine where authority over policy lies; “high clarity” 
                                                 
1
 Also consider how citizens use coalition behavior as a heuristic to update their perceptions of 
parties’ policy positions. For example, Klüver and Spoon (2016) argue that coalitions complicate 
citizens’ updating, while Fortunato and Adams (2015) claim that voters use the prime ministerial 
position as a proxy for the coalition position on policy (see also Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; 
Adams, Ezrow, and Wlezien 2016). These conclusions are consistent with our findings. 
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refers to the concentration of power in the executive. We contend that the clarity characteristic 
also matters for party strategists who seek to identify those foreign incumbents with programs 
that provide the most relevant, electorally successful precedents. Following Hobolt et al. (2013, 
171), we focus on governmental clarity: that is, the extent to which the executive’s attributes 
concentrate power in the hands of a dominant party within government (see also Powell and 
Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002). This attribute of 
governments, which varies over time, enables us to analyze how the changing dominance of for-
eign incumbents in successive governments affects whether and how governing parties’ pro-
grammatic positions diffuse internationally.  
We define high government clarity as the dominance of one party in the executive and di-
rectly measure this by the vote share of the incumbent party. High-clarity incumbents are greatly 
visible and electorally successful parties. They typically owe their dominant position in govern-
ment to their program’s electoral appeal. These platforms prove influential abroad because they 
are relevant, reliable, and available precedents for parties abroad that search for electorally suc-
cessful strategies. Thus, we should expect that party strategists “at home” focus disproportionate-
ly on high-clarity foreign incumbents. To illustrate this argument, consider the UK Conservative 
Party, which ruled in high-clarity, single-party majority governments in 1979-1990 under Marga-
ret Thatcher. The party’s visibility and re-election successes fueled a keen interest in its program 
by foreign party leaders and strategists who sought to position their own parties for electoral suc-
cess. Saatchi and Saatchi, the campaign consultants who first successfully worked with the Brit-
ish Conservatives under Thatcher, for example, were subsequently employed by the Danish Con-
servatives (1990), the Dutch Social Democrats (1989), and the Irish Fianna Fail party (1989-
1992) (see Farrell 1998, 172; see also Bowler and Farrell 1992). Foreign parties paid equally 
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careful attention to the Conservatives’ policy appeals. In 1983, the Conservatives’ manifesto 
pledge to implement privatization, including privatization of the telecommunications sector, was 
one of the most prominent and ambitious aspects of the party’s program. Thatcher’s triumph at 
the polls in the 1983 elections enhanced the visibility and appeal of the Conservatives’ pro-
grammatic stance for foreign parties in Ireland, France, Norway, and a range of other OECD 
countries that subsequently chose to commit to privatization. The electoral motives of parties in 
these countries, we argue, contributed to making the UK the origin of an OECD-wide process of 
policy diffusion in telecommunications privatization (Schmitt 2011, 105).  
This case illustrates a wider empirical pattern in the case-oriented literature, which sug-
gests that manifestos of high-clarity incumbents – through their electoral success and the policies 
that they implement – enjoy enhanced visibility and have a disproportionate influence on the 
programmatic choices of election-seeking parties abroad. The implication is that other prominent 
examples of party policy diffusion – like diffusion from the centrist “Third Way” campaign of 
Bill Clinton’s “New Democrats” in the first term of his presidency to Tony Blair’s “New La-
bour” campaign in 1997, or the recent wave of populism – could gain their momentum from 
dominant governing parties using these policies to their electoral advantage.  
Empirically, we analyze quantitative data on 26 established democracies in Europe since 
1977. The results show that high-clarity incumbents are the most cross-nationally influential po-
litical parties. This finding remains robust to changes in the research design and model specifica-
tions, which we discuss in detail in the Supplementary Materials. In our conclusion, we discuss 
how our argument and findings inform the debates in international and comparative politics on 
party competition, policy diffusion in transnational politics, and the political consequences of 
clarity of government. 
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Heuristics, Government Clarity, and Party Policy Diffusion  
In their search for electorally successful strategies, parties operate under electoral uncer-
tainty and are likely to rely on heuristics to identify the most attractive programs. The platforms 
of dominant, high-clarity incumbents abroad offer an attractive shortcut for party strategists in 
judging the appeal of a party’s program. They do so for three reasons.  
1. When considering whether to emulate foreign incumbents, party strategists will 
look to the largest, electorally most successful governing parties. This makes 
dominant, high-clarity incumbents a relevant precedent.  
2. High government clarity enables party strategists to identify and emulate those 
foreign parties that owe their incumbency most directly to the electoral success of 
their policy programs rather than coalition negotiations. This enhances the relia-
bility of incumbency as a heuristic for judging the electoral attractiveness of these 
parties’ platforms.  
3. Dominant, high-clarity incumbents attract disproportionate media attention, which 
makes their platforms more available as precedents, facilitates emulation, and 
projects their international policy influence.  
 Office-seeking parties face uncertainty in the electoral process (Budge 1994, 445; see 
also Somer-Topcu 2009; 2015) and difficulties with calculating optimal electoral strategies (La-
ver and Sergenti 2012). Prior scholarship provides evidence that parties use various heuristics to 
manage this uncertainty and to make inferences about relevant information (see Weyland 2005). 
It therefore seems likely that cognitive short cuts also apply to their choice of their electoral 
strategy (also Simon 1955; Tversky and Kahneman 1982a; 1982b; Kahneman and Frederick 
2002; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). For example, parties may follow a “gradient climbing” 
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heuristic by moving in a given policy direction if this improves their electoral outcomes as 
measured by vote share (Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992; 1998; Bendor, Mookherjee, and Ray 
2005; Jackson 2003). Similarly, electoral defeat leads parties to conclude that the electorate has 
moved away from their position under circumstances of uncertainty (Somer-Topcu 2009: 240).  
Heuristics are also likely to matter for the process that drives diffusion between party 
programs. The literature emphasizes learning from and emulation of policies from abroad 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Most and Starr 1990; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, 
and Garrett 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Gilardi 2010, 2012). One causal pathway 
for policy diffusion arises when parties look to foreign incumbent parties for guidance about pol-
icies that might help them to win elections at home (Böhmelt et al. 2016). Since strategists want 
their parties to win office, they are likely to focus their attention on foreign parties that assumed 
power.  
Two types of cognitive heuristics guide parties in choosing which incumbents to emulate 
and learn from – the availability heuristic and the representativeness heuristic. According to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982b, 164), “a person is said to employ the availability heuristic 
whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or associations 
can be brought to mind.” Using the availability heuristic, a party’s subjective probability of a 
certain policy helping it to win office will increase with the ease with which it can be recalled 
that foreign incumbents successfully adopted this policy as part of their winning platforms. Un-
der the representativeness heuristic, “probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A resem-
bles B” (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1124). Employing this heuristic, a party judges its chanc-
es of success are higher if its policies resemble those of foreign incumbents.  
  
7 
 
To analyze how these heuristics could influence which foreign incumbents political par-
ties learn from and emulate, we combine the literature on party policy diffusion with that on clar-
ity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000; 
Nadeau et al. 2002; Hobolt et al. 2013). High clarity of responsibility enables voters to determine 
where authority over policy lies and to hold politicians accountable. Responsibility for policy 
outcomes is clear when features of the government itself and the wider institutional context con-
centrate power, rather than dispersing it. We focus on a specific aspect of clarity of responsibil-
ity, government clarity, which refers to the concentration of responsibility within a government. 
This characteristic affects not only whether voters can identify responsibility for policy, but also 
how party strategists attribute responsibility for incumbency, in their search for electorally suc-
cessful programs.  
Government clarity enables party strategists to identify those foreign parties that are most 
electorally successful and owe their dominant position in government most directly to their pro-
gram’s electoral appeal. The literature identifies several government features that contribute to 
government clarity including the dominance of the major governing party in coalition, single 
party government, majority government, the government’s ideological cohesion, and in semi-
presidential democracies, unified control of the government and presidency by the same party  
(Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000; Hobolt et al. 2013). We focus on the measure that 
best captures a party’s dominance within government – its vote share.2 We expect that the con-
                                                 
2
 As noted, legislative seat share and government portfolio share are alternative measures of the 
same concept. In the Supplementary Materials, we show that our results are robust to these alter-
native operationalizations of our explanatory variable 
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centration of responsibility within a government facilitates international party policy diffusion 
through learning and emulation by focal parties for three related reasons. 
First, high-clarity governments are those with large incumbents that govern alone or in 
coalition with significantly smaller, junior coalition partners (Anderson 2000, 154; see also 
Whitten and Palmer 1999; Nadeau et al. 2002; Hobolt et al. 2013). The larger vote share of in-
cumbent parties not only enables them to gain office in the first place, but also to dominate poli-
cymaking within a governing coalition. For party strategists, a foreign incumbent’s dominance in 
government, as captured by its vote share, acts as a cognitive short cut in judging the electoral 
appeal of the incumbent’s platform. The largest incumbents are those who are electorally most 
successful – and for a party that aims to improve its electoral success by adopting the winning 
strategies of incumbents abroad, the most successful of these incumbents provides the most rele-
vant precedent.  
Second, high government clarity enables party strategists to identify and emulate those 
parties that owe their incumbency most directly to the electoral success of their policy platforms 
rather than coalition negotiations. Consider the contrast between a high-clarity, single party ma-
jority government and a coalition in which power is dispersed among multiple small partners: 
The majority party owes its dominant position in government directly and solely to its electoral 
victory. By contrast, coalition formation results from a bargaining process in which electoral 
performance and party size is only one parameter. In addition, coalition participation is influ-
enced by considerations such as coalition size, that is, minimal winning status and the number of 
parties in the coalition (Riker 1962; Leiserson 1968); policy, including the ideological compati-
bility of the partners, the inclusion of the median party, or the presence of parties with anti-
establishment views (Axelrod 1970; De Swann 1973; Laver and Schofield 1990; Budge and 
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Keman 1990); the history of parties in working together (Tavits 2008) and institutional con-
straints (Strøm 1990; Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994). While these additional considerations play 
a role in the formation of all coalitions, they particularly blur the relevance of a party’s platform 
to winning office when the electoral results produce no obvious dominant incumbent. Put differ-
ently, low clarity situations, which disperse power among multiple small parties, complicate par-
ty strategists’ task of identifying how far the electoral appeal of a party’s program rather than 
other considerations in coalition bargaining contributed to its success in winning incumbency. 
This makes incumbency in a high-clarity government in which power is concentrated in a single 
or dominant party a more reliable short-cut in judging the electoral appeal of a party’s platform 
than participation in low clarity coalitions. As a result, the platforms of the biggest and most 
dominant incumbent parties inspire more cross-national learning by parties in other systems that 
wish to maximize their chances of winning office. 
Third, media attention to incumbents varies with the concentration of government re-
sponsibility. Not only do dominant incumbents typically receive considerably more attention 
than junior coalition partners (Schneider, Schönbach, and Semetko 1999; Schoenbach, de Rid-
der, and Lauf 2001; Semetko and Schoenbach 1999), 3 high-clarity incumbents also receive 
greater attention than parties in governments that disperse power. Dominant governing parties 
                                                 
3
 Consider the difference in media attention that the German Green party and the (Liberal) Free 
Democratic Party receive as minor coalition partners when they are in office, compared to the 
more dominant parties (CDU/CSU and the SPD). The UK Liberal-Democrats are another exam-
ple. Media attention to their program in the 2016 election and their ability to keep the campaign 
focused on their concerns lagged significantly behind their dominant coalition partner, the Con-
servative Party. 
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have privileged access to “political and media resources” (Pan and Kosicki 2001, 60; see also 
Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015), which they can leverage to control the political nar-
rative, including the framing of election campaigns. Keeping the campaign and media attention 
focused on the dominant incumbent’s concerns and program enhances its availability as a heu-
ristic for parties abroad. In contrast, low clarity environments, which give rise to competing 
framing attempts by multiple governing parties of similar weight, are likely to disperse media 
attention making the platform of any one incumbent a less dominant and available precedent for 
foreign party strategists.  
In sum, for a party looking abroad, the platforms of dominant foreign incumbents in high-
clarity government environments are more relevant, reliable, and available precedents than the 
platforms of low clarity incumbents who won fewer votes and must share power to a greater de-
gree. As result we expect that a party’s dominant role within its government enhances its proba-
bility of becoming an international target of learning and emulation. Our hypothesis summarizes 
this expectation: 
 
Government Clarity Hypothesis: Political parties are more likely to learn from and emu-
late the policy platforms of foreign incumbents that bear dominant responsibility within their 
governments (measured by the vote share of the incumbent party). 
 
Research Design 
Data and Dependent Variable 
Our unit of analysis is the party-year, our dataset containing information on 215 political 
parties in 26 European democracies between 1977 and 2010 (see also Böhmelt et al. 2016). We 
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use the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) left-right measure of party positions (Budge et 
al. 2001; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, and McDonald 2006; Volkens, Lehmann, Mat-
thieß, Merz, Regel, and Werner 2015). The left-right dimension provides a common vocabulary 
for political elites and voters relating to the salient issues of the government’s role in the econo-
my and the distribution of income (Huber and Inglehart 1995; Warwick 2002).4 It is the most 
important dimension for issue competition (Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000; see also 
McDonald and Budge 2005). The CMP left-right measure is broadly consistent with those de-
rived using other methods (Hearl 2001; McDonald and Mendes 2001; Laver, Benoit, and Garry 
2003; see also Marks Hooghe, Steenbergen, and Bakker 2007). We rescale the CMP scores from 
1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) to make it consistent with the median voter scale we use. 
Because the spatial analysis we employ requires equally spaced observations (Franzese and Hays 
2007; 2008), we interpolate scores between the election years for which the CMP data is availa-
ble. In the text, we report analyses based on interpolating under the assumption that party posi-
tions do not change until the next election year.5  
                                                 
4
 Ideological structuring underlying the left-right scale in Eastern Europe may differ from that in 
Western Europe (Evans and Whitefield 1993) as well as across countries and time (Evans and 
Whitefield 1998; Harbers, De Vries, and Steenbergen 2012; Linzer 2008; Markowski 1997). 
However, there are strong arguments for using left-right dimension to understand party competition 
in post-communist democracies (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards 2006, 169; Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker 2011; McAllister and White 2007).  
5
 For example, if a social democratic party moderates its left-right position from 3 to 4 between 
elections that occur in 1997 and 2001, the yearly estimates for this party would be the following: 
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Methodology 
We estimate spatio-temporal lag models (Franzese and Hays 2007; 2008), where a party’s 
position at time t is a function of foreign parties’ positions at an earlier time e-1 and a weighting 
matrix specifies which subset of foreign parties exert influence. For instance, if it is believed that 
only foreign incumbents count, the matrix has zero entries in the row for party i except in col-
umns corresponding to parties j that are foreign incumbents, where the entry is positive. Thus, 
the equation we estimate is, 
yt=φyt-1+ βXt-1+ρWye-1+ε,                                                  (1)   
where: yt is Party Position and yt-1 is its lagged value. Xt-1 is a set of controls lagged by one year 
discussed in detail below, year and country fixed effects, and the constant. ɛ is the error term. 
Wye-1 is the product of a connectivity matrix (W) and the temporally lagged dependent variable 
(ye-1). Notice that it is the position of other parties, j, in the year before the last election in their 
country before time t that is used when calculating Wye-1 (hence the subscript e-1). Specifically, 
since developing party manifestos is a “time-consuming process [...] which typically takes place 
over a two-three year period during which party-affiliated research departments and committees 
draft sections of this manuscript, which are then circulated for revisions and approval upward to 
party elites and downward to activists” (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009: 832), we use parties’ 
policy positions of the year before the last election in their country when constructing spatial 
lags. To illustrate this lag structure, assume that the political parties competing in the 2002 Dutch 
national election looked to the party position of the incumbent UK Labour Party. The previous 
inter-election period in the UK was 1997-2001. Thus, given our assumptions, Dutch parties re-
                                                                                                                                                             
1997: 3.00; 1998: 3.00; 1999: 3.00; 2000: 3.00; 2001: 4.00. The appendix includes a more de-
tailed rationale for our data structure. 
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lied on the 1997 Labour Party position (a 5-year lag). The average lag for all spatial lags used for 
the analyses is 5.34 years (standard deviation 1.68).6  
We estimate the model using time-series cross-sectional spatial OLS (S-OLS) regression, 
which is justifiable since explanatory variables are temporally lagged (Williams 2015; Williams 
and Whitten 2015; Böhmelt et al. 2016). Recall Franzese and Hays (2008, 758), though:  
“estimating spatial-lag models by OLS yields biased estimates, even if not too 
badly biased if interdependence remains mild; though even then standard-error 
accuracy is elusive (and PCSE is no help). A simple alternative that may ease or 
even erase the simultaneity problems with S-OLS is to time-lag the spatial lag 
[…]. Insofar as a time-lagged spatial lag is predetermined – that is, insofar as the 
interdependence is not instantaneous, where instantaneous means within an obser-
vation period, given the model – no bias arises. In other words, if spatial interde-
pendence processes have no effect within an observational period, and if spatial 
and temporal dynamics are sufficiently well modeled to prevent spatial interde-
pendence from manifesting instantaneously due to measurement or specification 
error, OLS with a time-lagged spatial lag regressor is an effective estimation strat-
egy.”  
Considering the Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009, 832) argument that it takes time to develop 
party manifestos, an instantaneous diffusion effect is unlikely. Accordingly, we estimate the spa-
                                                 
6
 Alternatively, if we assume linearly interpolated party-position values, Dutch parties would 
have used Labour’s position in the year 2000, and the lag would be two years. For linearly inter-
polated party-position values, the average lag is 2.67 years (standard deviation=1.24). Empirical 
analyses based on linear interpolation do not affect our substantive conclusions. 
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tio-temporal lag model with a spatial lag that is temporally lagged by using party policy values 
from the year before the last election (the subscript e-1). Further, note that estimating spatial 
maximum-likelihood models instead (Franzese and Hays 2007, 163; see also 2008) does not af-
fect the reported results.  
Our empirical analysis also accounts for the possibility that international policy diffusion 
between party programs results from common exposure to similar economic (and other exoge-
nous) factors (Franzese and Hays 2007, 142). For example, a rich literature examines how inter-
national economic factors exert cross-national pressures that constrain government policy auton-
omy (Garrett 1998), the policy alternatives available to the left (Boix 1998), and the size and role 
of the welfare state (Rodrik 1998). Following Franzese and Hays (2008), to address this concern, 
we include the lagged dependent variable, party-fixed effects, and time-fixed effects. Including 
these items, plus a set of control variables, credibly ensures that contagion “cannot be dismissed 
as a mere product of a clustering in similar [party or state] characteristics,” that is by common 
exposure (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, 230; see also Franzese and Hays 2007; 2008; Plümper 
and Neumayer 2010, 427). In more detail, the lagged position of the party allows for path de-
pendencies in policy such as those caused by inertia in policy making, year-fixed effects control 
for common economic shocks such as macro-economic cycles, and party fixed effects control for 
constant, but idiosyncratic factors affecting a party’s position.  
 
Main Explanatory Variable: Spatial Lag for Government Clarity 
To capture “dominance” in the government, we rely on vote share that we incorporate in 
a spatial lag. This spatial lag then constitutes the main independent variable. As noted above, 
since it takes time to process information on other parties and to incorporate this into manifestos, 
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each spatial lag is based on the position of a party in the year before the last election in its system 
before year t (see also Böhmelt et al. 2016). Legislative seat share and government portfolio 
share are alternative measures of the same concept. These measures are highly correlated. A 
governing party’s dominance in controlling vote share is typically reflected in that party’s domi-
nant control over the government’s legislative seats, which in turn correlates with dominance in 
controlling government portfolios (Gamson 1961; Warwick and Druckman 2006). In the Sup-
plementary Materials, we show that our results are robust if legislative seat share and govern-
ment portfolio share are used as alternative measures of our explanatory variable. 
Incumbent parties with large vote shares are more visible for party strategists abroad who 
consider learning from and emulating successful foreign parties. In effect, their larger vote share 
makes these incumbent parties more dominant in the government, which facilitates government 
clarity (Hobolt et al. 2013, 170f). To test the government clarity hypothesis, we use the spatial 
lag WyIncumbent Vote Share defined as follows: in the row corresponding to party i, entries are 0 un-
less in column j the corresponding party was recently in government in another country (either 
forming the government on its own or as a member of a coalition) in which case the entry is par-
ty j’s vote share. Data for incumbency is from Döring and Manow (2012), and data on vote share 
is from the CMP (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2015).  
On theoretical grounds that apply in our context, we do not row-standardize WyIncumbent 
Vote Share
 (Böhmelt et al. 2016; see also Williams 2015 and Williams, Seki, and Whitten 2016). 
Here, row standardization would imply that parties allocate a fixed amount of effort to consider-
ing other parties’ positions independent of the number of such parties that might be relevant. 
This is not a rational approach: consideration should be given if the marginal extra information 
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gathered has greater value than the marginal cost of obtaining it, which does not imply the allo-
cation of a fixed amount of effort.  
 
Control Variables 
Parties respond to the positions of other domestic parties (Adams 2001; Adams and Mer-
rill 2009; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009) – particularly to members of their party family (Ad-
ams and Somer-Topcu 2009, 839; see also Adams 2001; Adams and Merrill 2009; Meguid 2005; 
2008; Williams 2015). To allow for this, we define two additional spatial lags. In   WyDomestic , in 
the row of W for party i the cell corresponding to the column for party j contains 1 if i and j are 
different parties competing in the same political system, otherwise containing 0. WyDomestic Ideology 
is defined in a similar manner except that in W cells contain 1 only if i and j are different parties 
competing in the same system that belong to the same ideological bloc, and 0 otherwise. Party 
family data derives from the CMP, but we follow the recoding suggested by Adams and Somer-
Topcu (2009, 834): Communist, Green, and Social-Democratic parties are recoded as “left”; 
conservative, Christian-democratic, and nationalist parties as “right”; and liberal parties as “cen-
trist”.7  
We further control for the position of the median voter using Eurobarometer data on re-
spondents’ left-right self-placement on a scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right) (Schmitt and Scholtz 
2005). These data cover EU member states from 1976, with additional data becoming available 
with the accession of new member states, and are also available for a few non-member states.8 
                                                 
7
 The parties belonging to remaining CMP families (namely, regional, agrarian, and other small 
specialized party families) are omitted. 
8
 We return to this in the Supplementary Materials. 
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We use Tukey’s method (1977) to calculate the median from the individual level data, and we 
then lag the median by one year to allow for delayed responses by parties.  
Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen (2011) argue that integration into the world economy pushes 
party positions to the right unless the median voter is already far enough to the right, in which 
case competition will already have pushed parties to positions at which globalization does not 
have an impact. First, we control for the economic component of Dreher’s (2006) Globalization 
Index, deriving from trade flows, portfolio and direct investment, tariff and invisible barriers to 
trade, and capital controls. Second, to allow for Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen’s (2011) findings, 
we include the multiplicative interaction Lagged Median Voter * Lagged Economic Globaliza-
tion. In the related literature, national macro-economic conditions are often controlled for (Wil-
liams 2015; Williams and Whitten 2015; Williams, Seki, and Whitten 2016). However, unem-
ployment rates, GDP growth, and inflation were insignificant when added to our model, and re-
ported results are robust to their inclusion (see Supplementary Materials). 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 summarizes three models. Model 1 focuses only on WyIncumbent Vote Share and the 
control variables, but omits the domestic-level spatial lags. Model 2 adds WyDomestic, while Model 
3 add WyDomestic Ideology to model 2. Because we do not row-standardize, the coefficients of the 
spatial lags cannot be interpreted directly; following Plümper and Neumayer’s suggestion (2010: 
430f; see also Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 39), we multiply the coefficient of the spatial lag by the 
average number of neighbors to assess short-term impacts. Because we include the temporally 
lagged dependent variable, long-term effects of spatial lags (and other explanatory variables) are 
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larger than short term effects in the current year. For instance, the impact of a spatial lag w is at 
period T > t is, 
tT
T
t j
jeijyw
−
=
−∑ ∑ 






0
1
1 βρ                                                     (2) 
β0 being the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 
336; Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 425). We estimate both asymptotic long-term effects and 
short-tern effects, and report them in Figure 1.  
Moreover, when including a spatial lag into a model, coefficients provide information about 
the pre-dynamic effects, that is, “the pre- [spatial] interdependence feedback impetus to outcomes 
from other regressors” (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010, 409). To fully understand the effect of the 
variables when including a spatial lag, one must estimate spatio-temporal multipliers, which allow 
the “expression of estimated responses of the dependent variable across all units” (Hays, Kachi, and 
Franzese 2010, 409). Our initial discussion of the effects focuses on the pre-spatial effects, but we 
have calculated spatial long-term equilibrium effects and present them in Table 2. 
As expected by our theory, WyIncumbent Vote Share is positively signed and statistically signif-
icant at conventional levels in Models 1-3. Substantively, a party’s left-right policy position 
would be 0.004 points higher in the short run, if all foreign (neighboring) incumbents shift one 
unit to the right, compared to the year before (Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 38). In the long run, as 
demonstrated with Figure 1, the effect increases to 0.015 when the spatial lag WyIncumbent Vote Share 
is raised by one unit. While these substantive results are based on Model 1, adding or dropping 
specific variables does not change the findings qualitatively. This also holds true when adding 
the domestic-level spatial lags (Table 1 Models 2-3).  
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Table 1. Government Clarity in Party Policy Diffusion – Incumbents’ Vote Share 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  -1.5745  -1.4626  -1.3808 
  (0.8895)*  (0.8854)*  (0.8916) 
Lagged Party Position  0.7511  0.7388  0.7385 
  (0.0129)***  (0.0131)***  (0.0131)*** 
Lagged Median Voter  0.4555  0.3990  0.3877 
  (0.1580)***  (0.1577)**  (0.1583)** 
Lagged Economic Globalization  0.0290  0.0262  0.0254 
  (0.0113)***  (0.0112)**  (0.0113)** 
Lag Median Voter *  -0.0061  -0.0053  -0.0051 
Lagged Economic Globalization  (0.0021)***  (0.0021)**  (0.0021)** 
WyDomestic   0.0060  0.0053 
 
  (0.0012)***  (0.0015)*** 
WyDomestic Ideology    0.0019 
 
   (0.0024) 
WyIncumbent Vote Share  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001 
 
 (0.0001)**  (0.0001)*  (0.0000)* 
Observations 2,718 2,718 2,718 
Year and Country Fes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.877 0.878 0.878 
RMSE 0.325 0.323 0.323 
 
Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed ef-
fects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (depend-
ent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 
median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties’ 
policy positions of the year before the last election. 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Long-Term Effect
Short-Term Effect
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
Spatial Effects
Figure 1. Temporal Short-Term and Asymptotic Long-Term Effects of WyIncumbent Vote Share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The horizontal bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Spatial effect of 0 marked with 
red vertical line. Estimates are based on Model 1. 
 
These effects appear quite modest because the spatial lag WyIncumbent Vote Share weighs the 
linkage by vote share and so the estimates are based on the neighboring governing parties 
(“neighbors”) having received 1 percent of the vote. If all neighbors have 2 percent of the vote, 
the influence of these neighbors doubles. With respect to government clarity, if all neighbors are 
in countries with low government clarity and receive, for example, 17.5 percent of the vote, these 
neighbors will influence the focal party by half as much the situation in which neighbors com-
pete under high clarity (in this example, these parties receive 35 percent of the vote on average). 
In the short run, these effects are: 0.004 * 17.5 = 0.07; and 0.004 * 35 = 0.14; and, in the long 
run, the effects increase to 0.015 * 17.5 = 0.2625; and 0.015 * 35 = 0.525, respectively.  
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Coming to the long-term equilibrium impacts, or the higher-order effect from the influ-
ence the policy position of i in e-1 exerts on its neighbor j in t, which in turn feeds back into the 
network and then influences others, including i, at time e+1 (see also Ward and Cao 2012, 1092-
1094), we assumed that the spatial weights and all other variables remain at 2010 values. Next, 
we hypothetically increase the parties’ policy positions by 1 unit on a 1-10 scale. We then calcu-
late the long-term effects on all parties, as the shock reverberates through the system of spatial 
and temporal lags using the following equation (Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 45), 
  (I – ρW – φ I)-1 ∆Xβ                                                           (3) 
where I
 
is the identity matrix, W
 
the sub-matrix of the ith weighting matrix for period t, and ∆Xβ                           
is the shock at time t. Since each unit will have a different set of linkages to its neighbors, the 
impact of a hypothetical change in xi will depend on which unit is being changed.  
Based on Model 3, Table 2 (WyIncumbent Vote Share) summarizes the findings from two such 
experiments for the impact of a one point increase in a party’s policy position on the 1-10 scale 
in 2010 for a selected set of focal parties: the CDU/CSU (Germany) and Labour (UK). Table 2 
reports the median (50 percent) equilibrium impact, based on 1,000 random draws from the mul-
tivariate normal distribution of the spatial and temporal lags. The simulations suggest that a one-
unit increase shock in the UK’s Labour party’s policy position would positively affect all other 
parties in the system. For instance, the German SPD would react to this by increasing its policy 
position by 0.16 units to the right. Likewise, the Dutch Christian Union would move to the right 
by 0.17 units.  
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Table 2. Spatial Long-Term Equilibrium Effects: WyIncumbent Vote Share 
Country Party 
Germany 
CDU/CSU 
UK 
Labour 
Netherlands GL Green Left 0.15 0.17 
Netherlands SP Socialist Party 0.15 0.17 
Netherlands PvdA Labour Party 0.15 0.17 
Netherlands D’66 Democrats‘66 0.15 0.17 
Netherlands VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy 0.14 0.17 
Netherlands CDA Christian Democratic Appeal 0.15 0.17 
Netherlands CU Christian Union 0.15 0.17 
Netherlands PVV Party of Freedom 0.15 0.17 
France Les Verts The Greens 0.14 0.16 
France PCF French Communist Party 0.14 0.16 
France PS Socialist Party 0.14 0.16 
France MoDem Democartic Mouvement 0.14 0.16 
France UMP Union for a Popular Movement 0.14 0.16 
France FN National Front 0.14 0.16 
Italy PdL People of Freedom 0.14 0.16 
Italy PD Democratic Party 0.14 0.16 
Italy UdC Union of the Center 0.14 0.16 
Italy LN Northern League 0.14 0.16 
Italy IdV List Di Pietro - Italy of Values 0.14 0.16 
Spain IU United Left 0.13 0.15 
Spain PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 0.13 0.15 
Spain PP Popular Party 0.13 0.15 
Spain CiU Convergence and Union 0.13 0.15 
Germany 90/Greens Alliance‘90/Greens 0.14 0.15 
Germany LINKE The Left 0.14 0.15 
Germany SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany 0.14 0.15 
Germany FDP Free Democratic Party 0.14 0.15 
Germany CDU/CSU Christian Democratic/Social Union 3.90 0.15 
UK Labour Party 0.13 3.92 
UK Liberal Democrats 0.13 0.14 
UK Conservative Party 0.13 0.14 
 
Notes. Table entries pertain to spatial long-term equilibrium effects when raising the party policy 
position of one of the parties highlighted in the last three columns by 1. Entries are based on two 
decimal places and rounded to this. Table only captures a selection of parties and countries in 
2010, not the whole sample. 
 
Linking these findings to our theory, we find strong and robust support for the Govern-
ment Clarity Hypothesis. Office-seeking parties operating under electoral uncertainty rely on 
heuristics, and foreign office-holders serve as an available precedent for the focal party wishing 
to gain office. However, not all foreign incumbents are created equal. They differ in terms of 
how clearly they control government (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; An-
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derson 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002; Hobolt et al. 2013), and we have shown that this influences 
their visibility abroad. For party strategists who consider emulating and learning from foreign 
incumbents, the evidence of a party platform’s electoral success is most direct when the incum-
bent bears clear responsibility for winning office. Relying on the vote share of governmental 
parties, we find that high government clarity projects the international policy influence of in-
cumbents.  
Finally, the results concerning the control variables corroborate the findings reported in 
Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), Williams (2015), and Ward et al. (2011). In line with the ex-
pectations expressed by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) and Williams (2015), the coefficients 
of the domestic-level spatial lags, WyDomestic and WyDomestic Ideology, have positive, nearly identical 
coefficient estimates, although the estimate of WyDomestic Ideology is slightly higher (around 0.006). 
This replicates the findings in Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) and Williams (2015) as we show 
that parties respond to the left-right policy positions of their competitors at the domestic level. 
Indeed, these estimates are (unsurprisingly) close to the estimates in Williams (2015, 152). Sec-
ond, there is evidence for a significant interaction effect between economic globalization and the 
median voter as the estimate on the interaction coefficient indicates that the further to the right 
the median voter, the more globalization pushes parties’ positions to the left (Ward et al. 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
Political parties respond disproportionately to the left-right positions of dominant govern-
ing parties abroad. Existing scholarship on the clarity of responsibility has traditionally focused 
on accountability “at home” (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 
2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013). We show that 
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government clarity has previously uncharted cross-national, and much wider, implications than 
generally understood. Our work also sheds new light on how leaders and strategists choose the 
policies that position their parties in electoral races (see Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000; 
Budge 1994; Budge Crewe, and Farlie 2010; Dow 2001; 2011; Erikson and Romero 1990; Glas-
gow and Alvarez 2005; Kedar 2005; Laver 2005; Somer-Topcu 2009; Spoon 2011; Tavits 2007). 
The heuristics applied by these decision makers identify the policy pledges of high-clarity in-
cumbents, who have secured a dominant position in government, as the most relevant and relia-
ble guide to electorally successful policies. 
We believe that this finding has practical implications. In the policy world, the electoral 
strategy of emulating dominant and successful foreign incumbents rests on the assumption that 
parties and voters operate in information environments with some broadly defined common con-
tent. The rise of new media and the fragmentation of communication channels presents challeng-
es not only to the party-political strategy of learning from successful incumbents abroad, but also 
to the informational mechanisms that underpin representation and accountability more generally. 
Parties may carefully craft programs to position themselves for electoral success, but the effec-
tiveness of that strategy will increasingly depend on their ability to communicate this position to 
voters by harnessing the full range of new and old media and reaching across segmented com-
munication channels. When parties master this challenge and rise to dominance in government, 
our research shows that their mandate will, in turn, encourage programmatic learning by parties 
in other countries. The reward of a clear mandate, therefore, is not confined to domestic politics 
alone, but can also be expected to contribute to the creation of a more congenial international 
policy environment. Put differently, our work highlights that electoral mandates entail global 
consequences. This has important consequences for how we understand effective political repre-
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sentation, responsiveness, and accountability in an age of increasing international interdepend-
ence. A narrowly defined “domestic-only” view of party policy choice and competition will fail 
to capture this reality. 
In addition, there are crucial consequences for the study of transnational policy diffusion 
(Elkins and Simmons 2005; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Gilardi 2010, 2012). While 
this literature primarily focuses on government-to-government public policy diffusion, we high-
light the importance of an additional party-to-party channel of transnational policy diffusion. 9 
Moreover, the literature on “partisan waves” (Hellwig 2001; Kayser and Peress 2012; 
Farrell and Newman 2017) shows that center-left or center-right party success diffuses cross-
nationally. Our study implies that another cross-national consequence of partisan waves is that 
they affect all the parties, not just those from the same party family or bloc. For example, if a 
social-democratic party is electorally successful, then parties abroad in general – and not only 
more left-wing parties – will shift to the left. Similarly, cross-national learning from successful 
governing parties who absorbed into their own programs at least some of the policies of populist 
                                                 
9
 The evidence we present shows that the programs of the most obviously electorally successful, 
dominant incumbents are emulated extensively across borders. Together with the well-
established finding that party positions influence public policy outputs (Kang and Powell 2010; 
see also McDonald and Budge 2005; Budge et al. 2012), this indicates that one channel for the 
diffusion of international public policy is programmatic learning by political parties from the 
platforms of highly visible incumbents abroad.  
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challengers can be expected to magnify the impact of the populist wave on party competition 
internationally.10  
Our work also holds insights for the politics of transparency. Transparency, that is, in-
formation about policy, is crucial to meaningful elections and accountable government, but the 
sources of transparency remain poorly understood. Focusing on the relationship between democ-
racy and transparency, for instance, Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2011) argue that trans-
parency is a consequence of democratic as opposed to non-democratic forms of government. Our 
results suggest that transparency cannot be attributed to the form of government alone. Among 
democracies, the information available to observers about the policy positions of governing par-
ties varies and is enhanced by government clarity. This, in turn, shapes programmatic emulation.  
Finally, our study leads to new opportunities to research how parties choose policies at a 
time of increasing cross-national interdependence. First, a core assumption of our theoretical 
work is that parties imitate the policy pledges of high-clarity, dominant incumbent parties abroad 
to compete more effectively at the domestic level. Future works could study whether this strate-
gy is effective in electoral terms. Second, although analyzing party policy diffusion on the left-
right dimension is an important first step, future research might examine the cross-national diffu-
sion of party positions in more specific dimensions such as European integration (De Vries and 
Hobolt 2012) or focus on issue salience competition strategies (Egan 2011; van Heck forthcom-
ing). Third, future work might explore in more depth how cross-national learning enters into the 
process by which political parties choose their policy positions. This requires contextual analyses 
                                                 
10
 A related but separate question is whether newly emerging populist parties copy the example 
of populist parties abroad that have been successful at increasing their vote share but (typically) 
not at getting into office. We leave this question for future research. 
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of the manifesto writing process in the context of parties’ organizational structures, the goals of 
their elites, strategists and rank-and-file party supporters (Meguid 2008; Spoon 2011; Tavits 
2013), to determine which actors within the party are responsible for copying parties in other 
countries. Along these lines, researchers might evaluate whether intra-party constraints condition 
learning and emulation (Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013; Lehrer, Ezrow, Ward, and Böh-
melt 2017) and affect the speed with which parties respond to foreign party policy shifts. Hierar-
chical political parties, in this context, may perhaps take less time to respond to outside stimuli 
that affect their own policies (see Ceron 2012; 2014; Greene and Haber 2016; Greene and 
O’Brien 2016; Lehrer 2012; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013; Schumacher and Giger 2017; 
Spoon and Williams 2017; Wagner and Meyer 2014). Factional disputes could take longer to 
resolve when parties are organized democratically internally, and this might also affect diffusion 
processes. An analysis of these factors, although outside the scope of this study, is necessary to 
reach a better understanding of how party policy diffusion occurs.  
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